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Petitioners/Appellants Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin submit this Reply Brief 
addressing the arguments xaised by Respondent/Appellee Utah Department of Health, 
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing (Agency) in its Amended Brief of Appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
It should be noted initially that the Agency cites no Medicaid-specific case law to 
support its response to any of the arguments raised by Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin. 
It simply tries to distinguish cases and minimize their importance. The only new cases it 
cites are Utah state court cases addressing rules of statutory construction and waiver of 
issues not raised in proceedings below. 
L THE ALJMISCHARACTERIZES THE LEVEL OF DISCRETION A 
STATE MEDICAID AGENCY HAS IN DEVELOPING AND 
IMPLEMENTING ITS MEDICAID PROGRAM. 
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin set out the 
general parameters of a state Medicaid agency^ s discretion in developing and 
implementing its state plan. They then identify how the ALJ mischaracterized an 
agency's level of discretion. The Agency does not address this basic question of the 
scope of discretion a state Medicaid agency enjoys. 
EL MEDICAL SERVICES AND DEVICES CAN FALL WITHIN MULTIPLE 
MEDICAID CATEGORIES OF SERVICES. 
Here Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin outline how Speech Augmentative 
Communication Devices (SACETs) can fall within multiple categories of services, 
specifically, Home Health Services (Durable Medical Equipment) and Prescribed Drugs, 
Dentures and Prosthetic Devices, as well as Physical Therapy and Related Services. The 
1 
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Agency asserts that since SACD's are separately and explicitly defined as speech 
language pathology services in the Medicaid Act and implementing regulations they 
cannot be considered DME or prosthetic devices. This position is critical to much of the 
Agency's legal analysis. 
Physical Therapy and Related Services is one of 29 categories of services that can 
be included in a state Medicaid plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(l 1). Home Health Services 
(42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(7)) andPrescribed Drugs, Dentures and Prosthetic Devices (42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(12)) are also in that list of 29 categories of services. Services for 
individuals with speech, hearing and language disorders fall within the Physical Therapy 
and Related Services category of services. These services include supplies and 
equipment as well. 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1). The Agency points out that SACD's can 
be considered a form of equipment under this definition. Appellee's Amended Brief pp. 
7-8,13. The Agency concedes that SACD's fall within the definition of Durable 
Medicaid Equipment (DME). Appellee's Amended Brief, p. 18. It does not confirm or 
deny whether they fall within the definition of Prosthetic Devices. 
The Agency asserts that since SACD's fall within the "speech, language and 
hearing disorder" group of services under the Physical Therapy and Related Services • 
category of services, they are intrinsically and exclusively within that group of services. 
It argues that SACD's cannot fall within the Home Health Services or Prescribed Drugs, 
Dentures and Prosthetic Devices categories of services (Appellee's Brief, p. 13), even 
2 
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though SACD's are not mentioned specifically in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110. The Agency 
offers no support for why SACD's can only fall within this one category. 
As outlined in Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended Opening Brief, the 
general proposition that a service or device can only fall within one category of services 
is contrary to the case law, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in Hern 
v. Beye, 57 F3d 906 (10th Cir. 1996), which, as apart of its analysis, determined that 
abortion services fall within at least four categories of services. Id, at 910. The Agency 
also offers no meaningful analysis why the inclusion of "equipment" under 42 C.F.R. § 
440.110 precludes SACD's from falling within "equipment" in "Medical supplies, 
equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home," found in the Home Health 
Services category of services (42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3)). The Agency's exclusivity 
argument is inconsistent with a case addressing the question directly. Fred C. v. Texas 
Health and Human Semices Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788,791-92 (W.D. Tex. 1996). 
The Agency argues that if SACD's fall within the category of Home Health 
Services, they can only be considered speech language pathology under that category of 
services. Appellee's Brief, p. 13. Home Health Services include: nursing services, home 
health aide services, medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the 
home, and physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech pathology and audiology 
services. 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(l)-(4). The Agency then claims that the definition of 
"services for individuals with speech, hearing, and language disorders" found in 42 
C.F.R. § 440.110(c) applies to "speech pathology" under 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). As a 
3 
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consequence, SACD's cannot be considered durable medical equipment under 42 C.F.R. 
§ 440.70(b)(3), but must come under "speech pathology" under 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). 
However, the terms in those two regulations are not the same. The definitions 
provided in,42C.F.R. § 440.110 are not general, but specific to the category of services 
Physical Therapy and Related Services. The term "speech pathology" used in 42 C.F.R. 
§ 440.70(b)(4) (Home Health Services) is obviously narrower than "Services for 
individuals with speech, hearing, and language disorders." The Agency fails to point to 
anything suggesting that the definition of "services for individuals with speech, hearing, 
and language disorders" in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1) also defines the term "speech 
language pathology" in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). Since "equipment" is specifically 
identified in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) and is absent in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4) it is more 
reasonable to conclude that SACD's fall within 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3) rather than 42 
C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). This is the conclusion reached by the district court in Fred C. v. 
Texas Health and Human Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788, 791-92 (W.D. Tex. 
1996). The vast majority of states likewise do not follow the Agency's analysis and 
consider SACD's DME, as laid out in Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended 
Opening Brief. 
The Agency claims that this exclusivity of SACD's as speech language services 
under the "Physical Therapy and Related Services" category of services in Utah's 
Medicaid plan has been approved by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS.) It points to three pages taken from Utah's CMS approved plan. Those i 
4 
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pages identify SACD's as an excluded service under speech language services. However, 
those documents do not state that SACD's are exclusively speech language sendees 
under the Utah plan. Nor do they identify SACD's as categorically excluded for adults 
globally. The Agency has not demonstrated that CMS was put on notice that SACD's are 
not considered DME or prosthetic devices, nor that they are excluded from coverage 
under those categories of services. From the documents presented all CMS approved was 
that SACD's will not be covered under the speech language group of services. Since 
CMS has approved the coverage of SACD's by roughly forty-nine states as DME or 
prosthetic devices, based upon the state plan provisions in the record, it also approved the 
coverage of SACD5 s by Utah under both of those categories, since the Agency has 
produced nothing demonstrating that they are specifically excluded under those two 
categories of services. 
It is clear that the Agency itself does not consider SACD's intrinsically and 
exclusively speech language equipment under the Physical Therapy and Related Services 
category of services. Utah Administrative Rule R414-70, Medical Supplies, Durable 
Medical Equipment, and Prosthetic Devices, effective July 23,2007,1 stated that 
augmentative speech devices were not covered for adults under the service categories of 
Durable Medical Equipment and Prosthetic Devices: 
Medicaid covers prosthetic devices that include hearing aids, special orthopedic 
appliances, prosthetic limbs, prosthetic eyes, braces, and orthoses. Medicaid 
1R414-70 was amended effective August 4,2008. In that amendment the provisions 
relating to SACD's were removed. 
5 
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does not cover prosthetic devices that include special shoes, cochlear implants, 
augmentative speech devices, and wigs or hair replacement after chemotherapy55 
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-7(1). 
Non Covered Items : 
The following are not benefits: 
(2) Augmentative Speech Devices. 
Utah Admin. Code R414-70-9(20). 
The Agency would not have included this specific exclusion of SACD's as DME 
or prosthetic devices if it considered them falling exclusively within the speech language 
services under Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services by federal 
regulation, or under its state Medicaid plan approved by CMS. The Agency points to no 
cases, statutes, regulations or agency documents that explicitly identify SACD's as 
equipment that come only within the Physical Therapy and Related services category of 
services. Its position is contrary to case law and the practice of 49 other states. 
HI. HOME HEALTH SERVICES IS A MANDATORY CATEGORY OF 
SERVICES AND DME, WHICH FALLS WITHIN THAT CATEGORY OF 
SERVICES, IS A MANDATORY SUBCATEGORY. 
The Agency concedes that the Home Health Services category of services is a 
mandatory category of services and must be included in Utah's state Medicaid plan. 
Appellee's Amended Brief, p. 13. 
DME is a mandatory part of Home Health Services. 
(b) Home health services include the following services and items. Those listed 
in paragraphs (b)(1), (2) and (3) of this section are required services; those in 
paragraph (b)(4) of this section are optional.... i 
(3) Medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable for use in the home. 
6 
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42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(3). 
The mandatory nature of Home Health Services and DME is critical in that the 
foundation of the Agency's argument is that SACD's are an optional service since they 
can only fall within the Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services. It 
argues that since SACD's are an optional service it has greater discretion to exclude them 
from coverage. The Agency's position on the scope of its discretion is not supported by 
the case law, but even if it was, it could not rely on this optional/mandatory distinction. 
IV. THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY 
NECESSARY SACD'S FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME 
VIOLATES THE REASONABLE STANDARDS MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17). 
In their Amended Opening Brief, Argument III, Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin 
present three independent arguments why the Agency's categorical exclusion of coverage 
of SACD's for adults violates the Reasonable Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17). First, such a policy is unreasonable in that it denies some adults a device 
that is essential for them to engage in a fundamental process, oral communication. By 
doing so it limits that individual's independence. Second, such a policy creates an 
exclusive list of available DME, with no reasonable and meaningful process for 
requesting medically necessary SACD's. Third, the Agency cannot categorically exclude 
from coverage a medically necessary service that falls within a category of services 
included in the Utah Medicaid plan. 
The Agency's Response 
7 
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Of those three arguments, the Agency addresses only one directly - that its policy 
creates an exclusive list of available DME, with no reasonable and meaningful process 
for requesting medically necessary SACD's. Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-22. The Agency 
does not specifically address Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's analysis under the 
other two arguments. It begins by more generally asserting that the Reasonable 
Standards mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), applies only to Medicaid agency policies 
regarding Medicaid eligibility. It does not apply to policies regarding service coverage. 
To the extent it does apply to coverage of specific services or equipment the Agency 
asserts that it only applies to financial criteria for coverage of those specific services or 
equipment. 
The Agency next attempts to distinguish cases cited by Nicholas Conley and Patty 
Olguin in the three parts of their Reasonable Standards argument. It does not apply the 
distinctions to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin5 s analysis under any of those three 
arguments. It does not explain how those distinctions affect the specific theory of those 
arguments. The Agency distinguishes Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1996) by 
arguing that its holding only applies to mandatory services. It then relates this to its 
position that SACD's can only be considered speech language services and equipment, a 
part of the optional category of Physical Therapy and Related Services. Based upon the 
i 
mandatory versus optional distinction, it asserts Hern does not apply. 
The Agency next identifies differences in the issues before the courts between 
this matter and McMillian v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475 (CD. 111. 1992). However, i 
8 
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Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite McMillian only for the very general proposition 
that a state Medicaid agency's discretion in developing and implementing its state 
Medicaid plan is limited. 
The Agency argues that the decision in William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267 
(N.D. Ga. 2000) is unpersuasive here. The court left open the question of whether 
categorically denying adults SACD' s while providing them to children violates the 
Reasonable Standards or Amount, Duration and Scope Medicaid mandates, or the CMS 
Dear State Medicaid Director letter of September 4, 1998 (DeSario Letter.) 
As a final global challenge to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reasonable 
Standards arguments the Agency asserts that their position creates an irreconcilable 
conflict between the federal regulations that make SACD's an optional service under the 
category of Physical Therapy and Related Services and the broader Reasonable Standards 
mandate. It claims that those regulations specifically target SACD's exclusively as an 
optional service. It would then follow that since SACD's are not a mandatory service, 
and since rules of statutory construction require that irreconcilable conflicts between a 
more specific and more general statutory provision be resolved in favor of the more 
specific provision, Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reasonable Standards 
arguments fail. Underpinning this argument is the unarticulated position that a state 
Medicaid agency has far more discretion to limit the coverage of services within an 
optional category of services than it does with services within mandatory categories of 
services, a position it never supports with case law. 
9 
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In a separate Point IV, the Agency contends that Nicholas Conley and Patty 
Olguin cannot raise for the first time on appeal the Reasonable Standards argument that 
its policies in effect create an exclusive list with no reasonable and meaningful procedure 
for requesting an SACD, Argument IILB. of their Amended Opening Brief It asserts that 
they have waived the right to raise it since that argument was not presented in the 
administrative proceedings below. It further argues that, if the court decides to consider 
the argument, that it should reject it because (1) the DeSario Letter that is the foundation 
of the claim should be given little weight, and (2) it has a reasonable and meaningful 
procedure for requesting coverage of SACD's. That process is the standard 
administrative review process in which this case began. 
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reply 
A. THE AGENCY'S POLICY THAT EXCLUDES COVERAGE OF 
MEDICALLY NECESSARY SACD'S FOR ADULTS AS DME IS 
UNREASONABLE IN THAT IT MAKES UNAVAILABLE A DEVICE 
THAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ENGAGING IN A FUNDAMENTAL AND 
ESSENTIAL HUMAN PROCESS, COMMUNICATING ORALLY, AND 
LIMITS THE INDIVIDUAL'S INDEPENDENCE. 
The Agency did not address this argument. 
B. THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY 
NECESSARY SACD'S FOR ADULTS AS DME CREATES AN 
EXCLUSIVE LIST FOR WHICH THERE IS NO REASONABLE AND 
MEANINGFUL PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING THE DEVICE. 
This variation of the Reasonable Standards argument was not brought in the 
administrative proceedings below. Regardless of that fact this court can and should 
consider this legal argument. 
10 
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The rule on waiver of an issue that is not raised in initial proceedings is not an 
absolute. 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 297 (2010); Apex Electronics Corp. v. Gee, 217 
Wis. 2d 37-8,577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). It is appropriate to ignore the rule when the issue 
involves a question of law and there are no facts in dispute. Roberts v. American Family 
Mutual Insurance Co., 144 P.3d 546 (Colo. 2006) (undisputed facts); Noghrey v. Town of 
Brookhaven, 21 A.D.3d 1016, 801 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 2005) (issue was not based on 
new facts, but rather, involved a question of law appearing on the face of the record). 
Whether both parties have had the opportunity to brief the issue is also a factor an 
appellate court should consider. County of Montgomery v. Deer Creek, Inc., 29 A 111. 
App. 3d 851, 691 N.E.2d 185 (SthDist. 1998). 
The Agency cites Holmstrom v. CR. England, Inc., 8 P.3d 281 (UT 2000) in 
support of its waiver argument. The issue there was a mixed issue of law and fact -
whether a proposed jury instruction was appropriate. The Court stated that one of the 
purposes of the waiver rule is to promote judicial economy. Id. at 288. Requiring parties 
to raise issues at the trial level makes the parties "crystallize issues prior to appeal." Id. 
Here judicial economy will be promoted if the court considers this argument. 
There are no factual disputes in this appeal. As solely a legal argument this court would 
look at the argument in question independent of any legal analysis of the ALJ, had it been 
raised below. The legal issue is "crystallized." The Agency is not prejudiced by 
considering this argument. Nothing more could have been done at the administrative 
level to more fully flesh out the issue. The Agency briefed the substance of the argument 
11 
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at this level. Should the court rule against Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin without 
addressing this legal theory other adults needing an SACD can request prior authorization 
for coverage of an SACD and eventually raise this argument again to this court during 
appellate review. 
It should be noted that in a separate administrative appeal, involving a different-
adult requesting prior authorization of coverage for a medically necessary SACD, the 
Agency moved to place that appeal in pending status until this appeal could be decided. 
In its initial motion the Agency stated that all issues that would come before the ALJ 
were already before this court on appeal: 
[t]he attorney handling the appeal for the state in the combined cases informed 
counsel for the respondent agency in the present matter that the reasonable 
standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not opposing the 
issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process... The 
appellate attorney for the state has responded with an amended response brief to 
respond to the appellant's amended reasonable standards argument. 
With the reasonable standards argument being presently argued and heard by the 
Court of Appeals on the identical issue of augmented speech devices not being 
provided to adults under Medicaid, but, to children under Medicaid's EPSDT 
program, there is no reason to brief it before the ALJ in the present matter. 
Motion to Place Case in Pending Status; X v. Utah Department of Health, Case No. 10-
357-01, pp. 2-3? The position taken by the Agency in that administrative matter 
indicates that it has fully addressed this Exclusive List/Reasonable Standards argument in 
this appeal. It will not be prejudiced if this court hears this issue. In fact, it argued that 
judicial economy would be better served if the legal question is considered here and 
2
 A copy of the Motion to Place Case in Pending Status, the Response and Reply are 
included in the Reply Addendum. 
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stayed at the administrative hearing level in the other case. What cannot be allowed is for 
the Agency to play it both ways: ask that it be considered in neither case. 
The Agency responded substantively to Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's 
exclusive list argument by stating that it should be rejected because the CMS DeSario 
Letter that it is based upon should be given little weight. It characterizes the decision in 
William T v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267 (NX). Ga. 2000) as questioning the 
"credibility" of the letter, quoting language in the decision about the deference that 
should be given to the letter. This is an inaccurate characterization of the court's 
analysis. In fact the court noted that "the letter reflects a reasonable interpretation of the 
law and that it forecloses defendants' contention." Id. at 1279. The discussion quoted by 
the Agency has nothing to do with the substance of the letter. Instead, it addresses in 
general what weight an agency guidance letter should be given under Chevron standards. 
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite cases where the 
courts gave the letter far greater deference, including the United States Supreme Court in 
Slekis v. Thomas, 523 U.S. 1098 (1999). 
The Agency asserts that it has a reasonable and meaningful procedure for 
requesting items of DME not appearing on its list of covered equipment - the 
administrative appeal process. This is not a procedure specific to the process of 
requesting coverage of an unlisted item of DME. The effectiveness of this process was 
demonstrated below - the request was not considered because coverage of SACD's for 
13 
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adults is categorically denied. It is a process with no possibility of approval of the 
device for any adult individual. 
C. THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY 
NECESSARY SACD'S, WHICH FALL WITHIN THE COVERED 
CATEGORY OF SERVICES DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT/HOME 
HEALTH SERVICES, VIOLATES THE REASONABLE STANDARDS 
MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). 
The requirement asserted here is simple: if you include a category of services in. 
your state Medicaid plan, you must cover all medically necessary services that fall within 
that category of services. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's primary support for that 
position is the Tenth Court of Appeals' decision in Hern v. Beye, 57 R3d 906 (10 Cir. 
1996), although they cited other cases holding the same. While the Agency's effort to 
minimize Hern's relevance was not raised specifically under this argument, they will 
address it here. The Agency points out that the services in Hern were services in a 
mandatory category of services. However, it failed to show how the court's analysis 
would change if the services in question were in an optional category of services that was 
included in the state Medicaid plan. Other courts have extended Hern's holding to 
optional categories of services. See Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 511 (8th Cir. 
2006); T.L. v. Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, 42 P.3d 63, 66 
(Colo. Q . App. 2001). 
Furthermore, the mandatory/optional distinction is irrelevant. The rule is well 
established that once a state Medicaid agency includes an optional category of services in 
its state plan it is bound by all Medicaid Act requirements as to those services. Weaver v. i 
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Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Fred C v. Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788,790 (WD. Tex. 1996). 
The Agency's argument unrelated to the specific theories presented by Nicholas 
Conley and Patty Olguin follow. Its global argument that the Reasonable Standards 
provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) applies only to eligibility questions is unsupported. 
The Agency cites no case supporting its proposition. This position was expressly rejected 
in Hodgson v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Hennepin, 614F.2d 601, 609 
(8th Cir. 1980) (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 2370-71 (1977)). 
In their Amended Opening Brief Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite numerous cases 
that apply this requirement to the coverage of services. They are not limited to financial 
considerations in coverage. 
The distinctions drawn by the Agency between this matter and the decision in 
William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp.2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000) do not in any way undercut 
Nicholas Conley5s and Patty Olguin's Reasonable Standards arguments. In fact, that case 
supports the irrelevance of a mandatory/optional class of services distinction. Many of 
the distinctions the Agency attempts to draw in this case go to its point that SACD's here 
fall within an optional category of services. However, one of the three defenses raised 
by the Georgia Medicaid agency in William T was that it 
has wide discretion in determining the amount, duration, and scope of medical 
care that is provided under its medical program and that because ACDs fall 
within one of several optional classes of assistance, GDMA has the discretion to 
limit the services it provides under the given optional classes of assistance. 
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Id. at 1272. The Medicaid agency did not argue whether SACD's should fall within 
speech language pathology as opposed to prosthetic devices because it felt the difference 
was irrelevant - both are optional categories of services and, thus, it had ultimate 
discretion to exclude coverage based upon that fact. Id. at 1285. 
The court ruled that Georgia's categorical exclusion of coverage of SACD's for 
adults and children violated the Medicaid Act. The Medicaid agency did not have the 
discretion it claimed. While it did not rule on the viability of an adult/child distinction in 
coverage, it did say that such a policy would likely violate the Reasonable Standards and 
Amount, Duration and Scope requirements of the Medicaid Act. Id. at 1288. The level 
of discretion that the Agency asserts here in regard to services within optional categories 
of services is the same as that claimed in William T. It has gone beyond the bounds of its 
discretion, just as the Georgia Medicaid agency had in William T. 
The Agency's asserts that Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position creates 
an irreconcilable conflict between the definition of speech language services and the 
Reasonable Standards mandate. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position creates 
no such conflict. The conflict is in the result the Agency wants. There is no conflict in 
the two provisions because the nature of each is quite different. The relevant portion of 
the "specific" regulation the Agency refers to, 42 C.F.R. § 440.110, is simply definitional 
i 
- it identifies what services come within the category of "Services for individuals with 
speech, hearing, and language disorders." 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c). The Reasonable 
Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) establishes a limitation on utilization ( 
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control. By their nature the two cannot conflict. There is nothing about Nicholas 
Conley's and Patty Olguin's interpretation of the relationship between the Reasonable 
Standards mandate and the Agency's policies that is somehow in conflict with the simple 
definition of speech services set out in 42 C.F.R. § 440.110. The conflict arises from the 
Agency's claim that since SACD's fall within an optional category of services that it has 
almost unfettered discretion in limiting or excluding the coverage of services within that 
optional category of services. This is the meat of the Agency's entire argument. It has 
cited no case law to support this position. 
V. THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF MEDICALLY 
NECESSARY SACD'S FROM COVERAGE FOR ADULTS AS DME 
VIOLTES THE COMPARABILITY OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). 
In their Amended Opening Brief, Argument IV, Nicholas Conley and Patty 
Olguin argue that the Agency's policy to categorically exclude coverage of SACD's for a 
subgroup of categorically needy individuals, adults, violates the Comparability of 
Sendees requirement of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). It also violates 
the Amount, Duration and Scope requirements of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) and (c) in that 
(1) it makes SACD's insufficiently available given medical purpose of the device, (2) 
they are insufficiently available when compared to other types of DME, and (3) it denies 
a type of DME necessary to address a specific impairment when other types of DME are 
available that address a different impairment. 
The Agency's Response 
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In response to these arguments the Agency again takes something of a shotgun 
approach. Its points are not related directly to the analysis laid out by Nicholas Conley 
and Patty Olguin in Argument IVA., and Arguments IV.B1~3. Instead, it asserts that 
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin are not arguing that they are being denied benefits that 
others are receiving, but instead are focusing on an age distinction. It argues that age is 
not specifically mentioned in 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) along with diagnosis, type of illness 
or condition. It thus follows that this provision could not apply in this case. It points out 
that subsection (c) of 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 speaks of "required" services, and since 
SACD's are optional services subsection (c) does not apply. 
The Agency next argues that its age-based differential treatment of SACD 
coverage is simply a consequence of Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis 
and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which requires states to provide enhanced services for 
children. It points out that the EPSDT provisions require a state to make available to 
children all 29 categories of services that can be included in a state's Medicaid plan. 
Only seven must be available to adults. It asserts that all medically necessary services 
must be provided to children while it has the discretion to deny adults medically 
necessary services that fall into any optional category of services, even when the relevant 
optional category of services is included in the state Medicaid plan. The Agency points 
out that a case cited by Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin, Lankford v. Sherman, 451 
F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006), notes the distinction between services for children and adults, 
stating that children may be given benefits not given to adults. Id. at 502. 
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The Agency attempts to minimize the relevancy here of Fred C. v. Texas Health 
and Human Service's Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (W.D. Tex. 1996), a case cited by 
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin in both their Reasonable Standards and Comparability 
of Services arguments. The Agency did not tie its argument about Fred C. to either the 
Comparability of Services or Reasonable Standards arguments specifically. It points out 
that the court in Fred C. referred to the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz. 1994). Salgado dealt with organ transplants, 
which are governed by a different Medicaid Act provision that requires like treatment for 
similarly situated individuals. It then looked at the history of Fred C. and from this 
attempted to show that along the way the court of appeals questioned an earlier decision 
in the case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in its second Fred C. decision said it was 
bound by its previous remand order because of the "law of the case" doctrine. Fred C. v. 
Texas Health and Human Sei-vices Commission, 167 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1998). The 
Agency calls the second court of appeals decision an "unenthusiastic affirmance." 
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Reply 
A. THE AGENCY'S EXCLUSION OF COVERAGE OF SACD'S FOR A 
GROUP OF CATEGORICALLY NEEDY INDIVIDUALS FOR REASONS 
OTHER THAN MEDICAL NEED VIOLATES THE COMPARABILITY 
OF SERVICES MANDATE OF 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). 
Contrary to the Agency's position, the age-based distinction its policy creates does 
involve the coverage of a device for one group of individuals and not another: children 
versus adults. The two groups are similarly situated in that for members in each group 
SACD's are medically necessary. 
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B. THE AGENCY'S CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF SACD's FOR 
ADULTS VIOLATES THE AMOUNT, DURATION AND SCOPE 
REQUIREMENTS OF 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) AND (c). 
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position that categorically denying access to 
SACD's discriminates on the basis of differing physical impairments (Point IV.B.3.) is 
supported in part by 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c). The Agency claims that the term "required" 
found in that provision means that it can only apply to mandatory services. This is purely 
a matter of speculation. It cites no case law or other regulations that support that 
interpretation of the term. "Required" could just as easily refer to a service that is 
required in that it is medically necessary for that individual. The Agency's interpretation 
of the term would make that term meaningless when you consider that services within 
optional and mandatory categories must be treated the same. See: Weaver v. Reagen, 
886 F.2d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1989); Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Services 
Commission, 924 F. Supp. 788, 790 (WD. Tex. 1996). 
The Agency's argues that 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c) is inapplicable because it speaks 
of arbitrary denial or reduction of services "because of the [individuals] diagnosis, type of 
illness, or condition." Because age is not included in this language this provision is 
inapplicable to the Agency's age-based exclusion of SACD's for adults. This argument 
completely ignores Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's analysis in their Argument 
IV.B.3. Their analysis in that argument is that adults needing SACD's are discriminated 
against as opposed to others with different types of disabilities who are provided different 
i 
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types of DME. Obviously the analysis addresses the condition of the individual, and not 
just their age. 
The Agency's global arguments that do not address the specific points laid out by 
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin follow. The Agency's discussion of the differences in 
services provided to children under the EPSDT program versus adult services suffers 
from a basic confusion between categories of services and individual services. The 
EPSDT program requires that all categories of services be available to children. Only 
seven of the 29 categories must be available to adults. The Agency misinterprets 
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's argument, characterizing it as all medically 
necessary services in all optional categories of services, whether or not included in the 
state plan, must be available to adults. Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's position is 
only that, for adults, when a category of services is included in a state's Medicaid plan, 
all limitations on a state agency's utilization control discretion apply to services falling 
within that included category of services. If an optional category of services is not 
included in the plan, then adults have no access to services falling within that optional 
category of services. The differences between children and adult sendees are substantial. 
The Agency states that Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006) 
supports the notion that children can be provided services within a covered category of 
sendees while adults can be denied those same services even if that category of services 
is included in the state plan. It cites dicta from Lankford, that a state "may lawfully 
provide additional benefits only to children and pregnant women." Id. at 502. Being 
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dicta, and saying nothing more, it is unclear whether the court is referring to categories of 
services or individual services within a category of services. As pointed out above, the 
Lankford decision supports the holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hern v. 
Beye, that all medically necessary services within a covered category of services must be 
covered. Given this foundation, it is more reasonable to conclude that the Lankford court 
was speaking to categories of services rather than individual services. 
The Agency correctly points out that Meyers v. Reagan, 776 R2d241 (8th Cir. 
1985) did not involve an age-based distinction in the provision of SACD's. Instead, Iowa 
categorically excluded SACD's to both children and adults. Nicholas Conley and Patty 
Olguin cite Meyers only in its Reasonable Standards argument involving the 
unreasonableness of refusing to provide a device that is so important to support an 
individual's independence and self-care. The analysis in which Meyers is used does not 
depend on an age-based distinction. 
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin cite Fred C v. Texas Health and Human 
Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (W.D. Tex. 1996). The Agency's effort to 
minimize the weight that should be given to this case is based on a misinterpretation of 
the language of the case. It's characterization of the second court of appeals decision as 
an "unenthusiastic affirmance" turns a discussion of the law of the case doctrine into a 
substantive evaluation of the merits of the plaintiffs' position. Most of the issues in the 
case were addressed in the first court of appeals decision. Fred C v. Texas Health and 
Human Services Commission, 167 F.3d 537, 1998 WL 915385, *2 (5th Cir. 1998). The 
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Texas Medicaid Agency was trying to reargue issues decided in the first appeal. The 
court of appeals was simply discussing why those issues would not be reviewed again 
based upon the law of the case doctrine. Id. At no time during this discussion did it 
question the reasonableness of the first circuit court decision on the three issues disposed 
of in that decision. 
The Agency also points out that the district court decision in Fred C. v. Texas 
Health and Human Services Commission, 924 F.Supp.788 (WD. Tex. 1996) relied in 
part on the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Salgado v. Kirschner, 878 P.2d 659 (Ariz. 
1994) and pointed out that the sendee denied in that case was an organ transplant. 
However, the Agency failed to state how this distinction affected the district court's 
analysis in Fred C , and how a different resolution would have been reached had that 
separate regulatory provision in Salgado not been there. The focus of the Salgado 
decision was the unreasonableness of the age-based distinction in the coverage of organ 
transplants. The district court in Fred C. referred to Salgado in its Reasonable Standards 
analysis. It did not mention Salgado in the context of the Comparability of Services 
mandate. 
Nicholas Conley's and Patty Olguin's Amended Opening Brief includes 
Arguments V and VI. The former lays out how the Reasonable Standards and 
Comparability of Services arguments apply to SACD's as prosthetic devices. The latter 
simply points out the fallacies of the ALJ's decision. The Agency did not separately 
address Argument V or Argument VI, so no reply here is necessary in regards to those 
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two points. 
CONCLUSION 
The Agency's position here is founded on two points. First, SACD's can only be 
considered speech language services, and those fall within an optional category of 
services, Physical Therapy and Related Services. Second, it has a great deal of discretion 
when choosing which services it will cover under optional categories of services included 
in Utah's Medicaid plan. 
Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin have demonstrated that SACD's fall within the 
Home Health Services and Prescribed Drugs, Dentures and Prosthetic Devices categories 
of services. The former is a mandatory category of services, and the latter is an optional 
category that the Agency has included in Utah's Medicaid plan. SACD's are not 
intrinsically limited to the Physical Therapy and Related Services category of services. 
The Agency has far less discretion than it suggests in determining which services it will 
provide. Its discretion is the same whether the service or equipment falls within a 
mandatory or optional category of services. It's policy categorically excluding coverage 
of SACD's for adults violates the Reasonable Standards mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(17) and the Comparability of Services/Amount, Duration and Scope mandates 
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of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10(B) and its i. 
and (c). 
Respectfully submitted this 11 
ementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) 
/of March, 2011. 
Robert B. Denton 
Laura Boswell 
Attorneys for Nicholas Conley and 
Patty Olguin 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class mail, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners' Amended Reply Brief, this 11th day of March, 2011, to 
the following: 
Nancy L. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
MarkL. Shurtleff 
Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858 
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David McKnight, (#5218) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark Shurtleff (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
288 North 1460 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101 
(801)538-6404 
dmcknight@utah. gov 
Attorneys for Respondent, Utah Department of Health 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION MEDICAID AND HEALTH FINANCING 
FAIR HEARINGS SECTION 
MOTION TO PLACE CASE 
IN PENDING STATUS 
Case No. 10-357-01 
ALJ Mary Kienitz 
Respondent. ) 
Pursuant to Utah Code § 63G-4-102(9) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
respondent, Utah Department of Health by and through David McKnight, Assistant Attorney 
General, moves the presiding officer for an order to place the above entitled matter in pending 
status. Good cause exists for this motion in that the identical legal issues involved in this matter 
including the reasonable standards argument are currently before the Utah Court of Appeals. It 
would waste the time and resources of the administrative adjudicative body and the parties 
involved in this case to go forward with briefing of the issues in this case when the identical 
issues have been briefed adjudicated and are currently in appellate review. 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
) 
Utah Department of Health 
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, 
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Argument Supporting Motion 
Mary Kienitz, the ALJ presiding in this matter held a pre-hearing on January 12,2011. 
At the pre-hearing counsel for respondent agency, stated that this matter concerns denying an 
augmented speech device to an adult under the Medicaid program. There are two combined 
cases concerning the denial of augmented speech devices to adults under the Medicaid program 
that have been adjudicated and are presently before the Utah Court of Appeals. The issues in the 
combined cases before the Court of Appeals are identical to the issues in the present case. As 
such, respondent agency asked that the present matter be put on pending status in order to wait 
for the outcome of the Court of Appeals decision. 
In response, petitioner stated that the attorney handling the appeal for the agency in the 
combined cases is seeking to have the Court of Appeals not hear the reasonable standards issue 
because the issue was not before the agency administrative proceeding. Petitioner wanted to 
now brief that issue in the event that the Court of Appeals would not hear it and then if needed 
petitioner could take the reasonable standards issue up to the Court of Appeals. 
Based on the understanding that the reasonable standards issue would not be before the 
Court of Appeals, the ALJ set up a briefing schedule for the parties to brief this issue. 
Petitioner's brief is due on January 31st and the agency brief is due on February 28th with 
petitioner's reply brief due March 10th. 
Subsequent to the prehearing on the present matter, the attorney handling the appeal for 
the state in the combined cases informed counsel for the respondent agency in the present matter 
that the reasonable standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not opposing 
the issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process. Further, the appellate 
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attorney for the state informed counsel for respondent agency in the present matter that the 
petitioner in the appeal has submitted an amended appellate brief where the reasonable standards 
argument is more fully presented to the court. The appellate attorney for the state has responded 
with an amended response brief to respond to the appellant's amended reasonable standards 
argument. 
With the reasonable standards argument being presently argued and heard by the Court of 
Appeals on the identical issue of augmented speech devices not being provided to adults under 
Medicaid, but, to children under Medicaid's EPSDT program, there is no reason to brief it before 
the ALJ in the present matter. It would be a complete waste of the ALJ's time, agency time and 
respondent's time as well as resources to brief issues that have been heard decided and are 
currently being appealed. 
For these reasons, the respondent agency respectively requests the ALJ to place the 
present case in pending status. Once the Court of Appeals rules on the legal issues that are 
identical to the legal issues before the ALJ in the present matter the parties then will know how 
to proceed in an appropriate and judicially efficient manner. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
-Signed-
David McKnight, (#5218) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No: 10-357-01 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of January, 2011, I e-mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO PLACE CASE IN PENDING STATUS, to the following parties: 
ROBERT DENTON 
DISABILITY LAW CENTER 
rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org 
MARYKJENITZ 
ALJ, UDOH/DMHF 
mkienitz(g),utah. gov 
ANITA HALL 
COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT 
UDOH/DMHF 
ahall(a),utah.gov 
-Signed-
David McKnight 
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Robert B. Denton #0872 
Disability Law Center 
205 North 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Phone: (801)363-1347 
Fax: (801)363-1437 
e-mail: • rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO PLACE 
IN PENDING STATUS 
Case No. 10-357-01 
Administrative Law Judge: 
Mary Kienitz 
Petitioner BHBiBfc hereby responds to Respondent's Motion to Place in Pending 
Status. In that motion Respondent moves that, in order to avoid wasting the time and resources 
of both parties, as well as the hearing officer, this matter should be placed in pending status, and 
await the Utah Court of Appeal's decision in a similar case, Nicholas Conley and Patty Olguin v. 
Utah Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, Utah Court of Appeals, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Respondent 
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Case No. 20100496 (hereinafter Conley/Olguin.) In Conley/Olguin the petitioners are appealing 
Respondent's refusal to cover Speech Augmentative Communication Devices (hereinafter 
SACD) for them because they are adults. This administrative appeal is based on the same legal 
issue, and the parties are currently briefing that same issue. 
As outlined in Respondent's motion, at a pre-hearing telephone conference held on 
January 12, 2011, Respondent requested that this appeal be placed in pending status since the 
issue here will ultimately be decided in Conley/Olguin. In response J H H B B I explained that in 
Conley/Olguin Respondent has contested the petitioners' right there to present a part of their 
Reasonable Standards mandate argument that was not briefed at the administrative stage. That 
argument states that SACD's are durable medical equipment. Respondent covers durable 
medical equipment. It also has a list that identifies what durable medical equipment is covered, 
and the limitation on that coverage. SACD's are not included on that list. When a Medicaid 
agency has a list of covered durable medical equipment it must still offer a meaningful process in 
which an individual can request approval of coverage of an item of DME that does not appear on 
the DME list. By categorically denying coverage of SACD's for adults Respondent maintains an 
exclusive list of DME for that and other items not appearing on the list. Respondent has no 
meaningful process for requesting coverage of a device that does not appear on its DME list. 
This list, without a meaningful process for requesting coverage of the DME, violates the 
Reasonable Standards mandate of the Medicaid Act. 
P H H H a l s o pointed out that by placing this appeal in pending status, without allowing 
the appeal to proceed, he would be denied his right to have this argument heard in a timely 
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fashion. The ALJ here could very well hold in 0 H B H B favor on the argument that 
Respondent maintains an illegal exclusive list of covered durable medical equipment. If this 
appeal is allowed to proceed that decision would be reached well before the Court of Appeals 
enters its decision and order. Based on these points raised b y ^ H H I the ALJ ruled that this 
appeal should move forward. 
ARGUMENT 
In this motion to place this appeal in pending status Respondent contends that in the 
Conley/Olguin case 
that the reasonable standard argument is before the Court of Appeals. The state is not 
opposing the issue as it was heard at the agency level of the adjudicative process. 
Further, the appellate attorney for the state informed counsel for respondent agency in the 
present matter that the petitioner in the appeal has submitted an amended appellate brief 
where the reasonable standards argument is more fully presented to the court. 
Respondent's Motion, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added.) However, while Respondent's appellate 
attorney represents that Respondent in that case has not opposed consideration of the Reasonable 
Standards argument "as it was heard at the agency level", it does oppose that part of the 
Reasonable Standards argument identified above t h a t ^ H H B ^ ^ to P r e s e n t i*1 this appeal. 
"Because petitioners did not raise and the ALJ did not rule on this issue in the course of the 
administrative proceedings, petitioners have waived it for purposes of appeal." (Respondent's 
Conley/Olguin Amended Response Brief, p. 21) A copy of the relevant portions of 
Conley/Olguin' brief as attached as Exhibit A, and Respondents brief as Exhibit B. Should the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Conley/Olguin accept Respondent's argument, and not consider the 
"exclusive list" argument the Conley/Olguin decision may not be determinative in this 
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administrative appeal. Therefore f P H H H will be substantially prejudiced in his right to have 
his appeal timely heard and decided. 
In the Conley/Olguin appeal the petitioners made reference in their legal arguments to 
three documents: the September 4,1998 Dear State Medicaid Director letter, a Letter of 
Understanding between Respondent and the plaintiffs who had sued Respondent because they 
were denied coverage of SACDs because they were adults, and the Utah Medicaid Provider 
Manual-Medical Supplies List. Respondent moved that the Court of Appeals strike those 
documents because they were not introduced in the administrative proceedings. The Court 
granted that motion. A copy of that Order is attached as Exhibit C. flHHHHQ will present 
those documents in these administrative hearings. It is possible that the Conley/Olguin decision 
will be influenced by the absence of those documents. To place this appeal in pending status 
would deny |BHBBB|his right to timely present those documents as a part of his legal 
arguments. He will be substantially prejudiced in his right to have his appeal timely heard and 
decided. 
Medicaid Act regulations require that decisions in the administrative review process be 
timely made. In most circumstances, a decision must be reached within ninety days of the date a 
request for administrative review is filed. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f)(1)(H). See also Shifflett v. 
Koslowski, 843 F.Supp. 133 (WD. Va. 1994). 0 M H J | f i l e d a Request for Hearing/Agency 
Action on or about December 23,2010. A written decision should be entered no later than 
March 23,2011. In Conley/Olguin Appellants' Reply Brief is not due until February 14,2011. 
Oral argument has not been scheduled. The Utah Court of Appeals decision will be entered long 
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after March 23,2011. Clearly, there will not be a timely decision in this appeal should it be 
placed in pending status. Placing this case in pending status will violate the Medicaid Act. 
T H E R E F O R E , ^ J J ( | ^ requests that Respondent's Motion to Place in Pending 
Status be denied,, and legal memoranda be filed as scheduled. 
DATED this 21st day of January, 2011. 
Robert B. Denton 
Attorney for Jacob Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, first class mail, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion to Place in 
Pending Status in Case No. 10-357-01, this 21st day of January, 2011, to the following: 
David McKnight 
Division of Health Care Financing 
Utah Department of Health 
P.O. Box 142901 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2901 
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David McKnight, (#5218) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Mark Shurtleff (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
288 North 1460 West, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-3101 
(801) 538-6404 
dmckmght@utah. gov 
Attorneys for Respondent, Utah Department of Health 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION MEDICAID AND HEALTH FINANCING 
FAIR HEARINGS SECTION 
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
PLACE CASE IN PENDING 
STATUS 
Case No. 10-357-01 
AL J Mary Kienitz 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-102(9) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
respondent, Utah Department of Health by and through David McKnight, Assistant Attorney 
General, as part of its motion for the presiding officer to issue an order to place the above entitled 
matter in pending status, replies to petitioner's response. 
Reply Argument Supporting Motion 
The petitioner correctly points out that the issue in both the Conlely/Olguin (hereafer 
Conley) case and the present case is strictly a legal one concerning whether the limitation of 
S ACDs to minors is consistent with the reasonable standards provision. Petitioner in the Conley 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Utah Department of Health 
Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, 
Respondent. 
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case has raised each of the legal arguments (more fully before the court of appeals) petitioner 
intends to make in the present case. 
Petitioner wishes to introduce a 1998 settlement agreement concerning SACDs involving 
respondent agency. A private agreement between parties to a former lawsuit, not even filed in the 
court in that action, has no bearing on the legal issue in the Conley case. The 12 to 13 year old 
settlement agreement could have been reached for a variety of reasons, the circumstances 
surrounding the agreement are uncertain and most important the agreement is not legal authority. 
As such, it has no application to Conley or the present case which concerns only a legal 
question. 
As to the CMS, 1998 "Dear State Medicaid Director" letter, petitioner's argument that it 
did not present the letter in the Conley administrative proceeding and is precluded from 
presenting the letter in its appeal does not mean that the substance of that letter is not presently 
before the court of appeals. Even though the letter itself was not used, reference to the letter with 
its relevant language and the argument petitioner wants to assert based on the letter is included 
and discussed in the Conley amended appellate brief and in a case cited in the brief (respondent 
provided a copy of the brief to the ALJ, the pertinent case explained and relied on by Conley is 
William T. V. Taylor, 465 RSupp.2d 1267,1282-1283 (N.D. Ga. 2000)). 
Petitioner also asserts as a new matter the need to address the list of durable medical 
equipment. The DME list doesn't prove anything the state hasn!t already acknowledged in the 
Conley case. That is, the state argued that SACDs fall only under speech therapy which means 
SACDs are not included in the preapproved DME lists. With SACDs falling only under speech 
therapy and not on a DME list, petitioner is able to argue (as it does) in its appellate brief the 
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issue of a having a meaningful process concerning items not on the DME list. Further, the fact 
that petitioner, as well as Conley and Olguin are able to use the administrative process to contest 
the denial of SACDs to adults is proof in and of itself that a meaningful process or procedure for 
challenging their exclusion exists. Again, the issue of a list and meaningful process to contest 
the list is addressed in Oonley amended brief. 
Finally, petitioner asserts his right to have the hearing process move forward in a timely 
manner. Placing the present case in pending status will not deny petitioner a timely hearing right 
since the issue involved in petitioner's case cannot be resolved until the identical facts and issue 
before the court of appeals in Conley are resolved. Putting the case in pending status will not 
delay the final outcome of petitioner's case. Even if petitioner's case has a new sub-issue, how 
the court of appeals rules on the Conley case will at a minimum substantially control and impact 
petitioner's case. Again, petitioner's case cannot be ultimately resolved until the court of appeals 
rules on Conley. 
In sum, this case and the Conley case involve purely a legal issue that will be resolved in 
Conley. There is nothing applicable to the legal issue in the present case that the appellate court 
will not hear and consider. Whatever the appellate decides in Conley will be binding precedent. 
DATED this 26th day of January, 2011. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (#4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
-Signed- _ _ _ 
David McKnight, (#5218) 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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No: 10-357-01 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of January, 2011, I e-mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO PLACE CASE IN 
PENDING STATUS, to the following parties: 
ROBERTDENTON 
DISABILITY LAW CENTER 
rdenton@disabilitylawcenter.org 
MARYKJENITZ 
ALJ, UDOH/DMHF 
mkienitz^utah. gov 
ANITAHALL 
COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT 
UDOH/DMHF 
ahall@utah.gov 
-signed- D. McKnight 
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